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A precautionary approach to compulsory licensing and tempering the data exclusivity 
obstacle for access to medicines 
 




This article takes up further on a framework developed for a precautionary approach (PA) 
which developing countries should adopt for granting compulsory licences in a national health 
emergency. Working within the legal mechanism of the precautionary framework developed 
from the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), the PA redefines a framework for compulsory licensing based 
on an adequate margin of safety when there are reasonable grounds for concern about 
uncertain risks that significant harm to human life and health may occur. The rationale 
adopted is based on legitimate differential treatment, precaution and risk management for a 
prescriptive, moderate and least restrictive measure to trade to enable access to medicines. 
 
Compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement was developed as a buffer for tempering 
patent protection and health to “allow for other use of the subject matter of a patent without 
the authorisation of the right holder” subject to certain conditions. The August 2003 Doha 
Declaration and subsequent TRIPS amendments for all member countries to be eligible to 
import provided a breakthrough for access by poorer countries to cheaper generic drugs. The 
chilling effect of the waiver is shrouded by obvious reticence on the part of developing 
countries to adopt the WTO language of “national emergency” and “extreme urgency” as a 
condition for compulsory licensing. The bold efforts by Thailand and Brazil in issuing 
compulsory licences in 2007 were adopted on grounds of “public non-commercial use” and 
“public interest”. An objective mechanism to trigger the grant of compulsory licensing would 
not leave developing member countries at the mercy of possible trade retaliation and 
sanctions that result only in price reduction bargains instead of a proper use of the inbuilt 
flexibilities under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
In addition to the patent obstacle, data exclusivity under the ambiguous Article 39.3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement poses another obstacle for access to medicines and the production of generic 
drugs even under compulsory licensing. Such regulatory protection of undisclosed 
pharmaceutical test data and the application of confidentiality to test data submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies so as to be able to obtain marketing approval of the products 
creates a data monopoly. It prevents the marketing of generic drugs even though the patent 
licences may have been granted by the government as generic drug manufacturers are unable 
to access the data. The authors query the obligation set out under Article 39.3 and consider 
the question of an implicit data exclusivity exception. The authors further argue holistically 
from a human rights perspective that a wider application of the precautionary approach to 
temper data exclusivity as a justification for disclosure in a public health emergency would 
enhance its prescriptive value. This article contemplates a parallel approach to overcome the 
issue of data exclusivity in the international trade and intellectual property regimes once a 








The health and trade worlds collide when intellectual property protection falls under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) umbrella.1 Two worlds debate as controversy on data 
exclusivity centres between developing countries’ needs and developed countries’ wants in 
the context of public health.2  Access to essential medicines remains a crucial issue for 
countries affected by humanitarian crises.3 The Doha Ministerial Declaration4 on TRIPS 
and Public Health (“Doha Declaration”) for public access to medicines culminated in the 
Decision of 30 August 20035 recognising the serious public health problems in developing 
countries and difficulties faced in making effective use of compulsory licensing. 
 
Against the backdrop of the global AIDS epidemic one of the most remarkable 
achievements in recent public health history was the rapid expansion of antiretroviral 
therapy in saving lives,6 a pace that needs to be sustained to be able to reach 15 million 
lives by 2015.7 In 2004 it was reported that only seven per cent of the people in developing 
countries received the very expensive anti-retroviral (ARV) therapy for HIV/AIDS,8 and 
that around five to six million in developing countries would die within two years without 
access to the drug.9 In 2012 there remained a 30 per cent gap between resources that were 
available and what would be needed annually.10 In 2004, of the 40 million people reported 
to be infected with HIV world-wide, more than 90 per cent were in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
India and Asia (less than five per cent were in the high-income countries);11 in 2011 there 
were still 34 million people living with AIDs globally with Sub-Saharan Africa the most 
severely affected. 12   
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1Since 1948 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the principal international agreement 
regulating trade in goods between nations in almost all aspects from promotion, negotiation and dispute 
settlement until the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January1995 under the Uruguay 
round of negotiations.  The WTO took over the GATT as the principal forum for trade adding on the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS).  With the advent of TRIPS, intellectual property rights were brought into the GATT-WTO 
system for the first time for protection and enforcement (See Understanding the WTO at <http www.wto.org >). 
2 See also discussion of the conflict between world trade and the human rights regimes in H Hestermeyer 
Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp 
172-3.  
3  UNAID 2012 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic, 51 (at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2012/20121120_UNAI
DS_Global_Report_2012_en.pdf). 
4  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm>.   
5 WT/L/540, Council for TRIPS, Decision of August 30, 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the DOHA 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm>.  
6 UNAID 2012 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic, p 50. 
7 Ibid. One of the ten targets countries pledged in the 2011United Nations Political Declaration on HIV and 
AIDS: Intensifying Our Efforts to Eliminate HIV and AIDS.  
8  UNAID/WHO “2004 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic” Executive Summary, p 4 (at 
<http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/pht/13911.pdf>). 
9 Ibid, p 13.  
10 UNAID 2012 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic, p 5.  
11 Figures calculated from UNAID/WHO “2004 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic” pp 5-7.  
12 UNAID 2012 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic, p 8. 
4/06/2013 4:27 p.m.    3 12 Mar BIL Copy   
 
As pharmaceutical patent protection unjustifiably interferes with access to medicines in 
developing countries13 there is support advocating that international intellectual property law 
should be harmonised with human rights law and arguably removed from the control of the 
WTO.14 However, an interpretive approach to TRIPS would augur well from a human rights 
perspective as flexibilities in the Agreement allow discretion for members to take measures to 
safeguard health albeit the fact remains that developing countries cannot afford to engage in 
“trade wars”. 15 The Agreement on Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)16 does not protect human rights but, as Hestermeyer asserts, a core of the intellectual 
property rights within the Agreement does.17 In line with this, once there is a trigger for 
compulsory licensing to be granted the data exclusivity obstacle needs to be considered in the 
same spirit as the Article 31(f) waiver for an encouraging way forward. Otherwise, the Doha 
Declaration is a pyrrhic victory for developing and least developed countries. 
 
2. A Precautionary Approach  to Compulsory Licensing to Temper Patent Protection 
 
The precautionary approach (PA) to compulsory licensing establishes that a margin of safety 
is necessary when harm has crossed a significant threshold but scientific evidence has not 
been established. The principle of precaution developed from international environmental 
legislation and adapted for human food and health safety has been touted for its ethical 
application 18  based on the notion that precaution should take priority over scientific 
justification “where the threat of a particular harm is serious and the damage is 
irreversible”. 19  The adaptation of the PA for the trade and intellectual regimes aims to 
supplement the inadequacy of a traditional evidence approach.  
 
Working within the legal mechanism under the WTO20 trade umbrella the prescribed PA 
framework establishes an objective mechanism to trigger the grant of compulsory licensing 
rather than leave developing member countries at the mercy of possible trade retaliation and 
sanctions that results only in price reduction bargains instead of a proper use of the inbuilt 
flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement. The legitimacy of adopting the PA for compulsory 
licensing is established with regard to the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and TRIPS Agreements by: 
 
                                                          
13  H Hestermeyer Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp 137 & 169. 
14  C Sexton “Editorial - Can Intellectual Property Laws Effectively Work to Advance Human Gene Research 
and Equitable Global Healthcare?”, Journal of the Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New Zealand 
Inc, Dec 2012. 
15 Ibid, pp 207 & 255. 
16 Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
17  H Hestermeyer Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p 198. 
18 Freestone, D. and Hey, E. “Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle” in Freestone, D. 
and Hey, E. (eds) (1995)The Precautionary Principle and International Law, The Hague, pp 3-15. 
19PC Hung, “The Precautionary Approach under the Right to Health Dilemma”, 24(1) International Review of 
Law & Technology (2010) 73-82. 
20 The relevant WTO instruments embodying a precautionary approach are: The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT 1947) – with reference to the health and security exception provisions in Article XX and 
Article XXI, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on 
Trade in Goods, and Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) - 
see Article 30 and the Doha Declaration. Though the concept of precaution has been incorporated into human 
health protection in WTO law its application, however, is somewhat fragmented with different weights given to 
different headings. 
4/06/2013 4:27 p.m.    4 12 Mar BIL Copy   
 
i)  examining and incorporating the structure of the risk analysis in compulsory licensing;  
 
ii)  exploring the extent to which members can exercise their precautionary entitlements in 
determining the grant of a compulsory licence; 
 
iii) justifying legitimate differential treatment of health technologies through the adoption of 
the precautionary approach in world trade and intellectual property based on a “like-
product” non-discriminatory analysis; 
 
iv) achieving the least trade restrictive approach; 
 
v) examining the implications of health technologies for society; and 
 
vi) setting various sub conditions. 
 
Once there are reasonable grounds for concern that significant harm to human life and health 
may occur, developing countries should adopt a precautionary approach for granting 
compulsory licences to manufacture medicines which might be needed for national health 
emergencies such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
as set out below: 
 
When confronted with a public health emergency, on the basis of the best information available, there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that significant harm to human life and health may occur, scientific 
uncertainty should not prevent states’ precautionary entitlements from adopting a temporary limitation 
on the exclusiveness of pharmaceutical patents to prevent/abate this harm for achieving an appropriate 
level of public health protection while avoiding unnecessary interference to international trade. 
 
The inbuilt flexibility for compulsory licensing under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement on 
pharmaceutical patents in a public health emergency sets out explicitly a buffer for tempering 
patent protection and health. 21  As a provisional measure, it can be regarded as a 
precautionary health measure offering a margin of safety to suspend the exclusiveness of 
intellectual property protection to safeguard public health. 22  Specifically through the 
interpretation of the Doha Declaration it can be implied that the notion of precaution has been 
incorporated, or at least accepted, under the TRIPS Agreement.23  
 
The paradox posed under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement requiring production under 
compulsory licensing to be predominantly for the domestic market effectively limited the 
ability of developing and least developed countries without manufacturing capacity to import 
cheaper generics. The much sought for waiver of Article 31(f) allowing all member countries 
to import was viewed to be a breakthrough,24 allowing access to cheaper generics by poorer 
                                                          
21 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement is a key provision allowing for other use of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder” subject to certain conditions.  
22  PC Hung, “The Precautionary Approach under the Right to Health Dilemma”, 24(1) International Review of 
Law & Technology (2010) 73-82. 
23 Ibid.  
24 All WTO member countries are allowed to import under the Aug 2003 Decision though 23 developed 
countries announced voluntarily not to import generic drugs under the system. The countries are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States of America (See Note 3, WT/L/540, Council for TRIPS, Decision of August 30, 2003). Countries 
such as Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
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countries, many of whom had felt cheated in the way the commitments of the Uruguay Round 
had been implemented.25 Nevertheless, the chilling effect post waiver is evidenced by the lack 
of attempts on the part of developing countries to pursue compulsory licensing until 2007 when 
Thailand and Brazil did so for the drugs Plavix and Efavirenz respectively.26  Even so, these 
were issued for “public non-commercial use” and the “public interest” conspicuously avoiding 
the WTO language in Article 31(b) of “national emergency” and “extreme urgency” as a 
condition for compulsory licensing.27 While the amendments post Doha under Article 31bis28 
of the TRIPS Agreement (spelling out the prescriptions on the flexibility to grant compulsory 
licences) are deemed to solve the dilemma for access to medicines, developing countries would 
benefit from a wider application of the precautionary principle beyond compulsory licensing in 
public health emergencies to enhance its prescriptive value.  
 
3. Another Obstacle: Data Exclusivity and Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
A broader holistic approach for the PA framework beyond compulsory licensing for access to 
medicines would help temper the data exclusivity obstacle under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which creates another barrier for access to medicines. Regulatory protection for 
pharmaceutical products concerns test data submitted to national authorities for verification 
of the efficacy and non-toxicity of drugs before obtaining marketing approval. Prior to the 
TRIPS Agreement test data protection existed mainly in the United States and Europe. Most 
countries were able to rely on data provided for the first registration to grant approval for a 
second comer’s “similar” product.29 It was legal for developing countries with manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Turkey and United Arab Emirates stated that if they do import it would be only be for emergencies or extremely 
urgent situations. (Press/350/Rev.1, 30 August 2003, “Decision removes final patent obstacle to cheap drug 
imports” at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm>). 
25 R P Buckley “Introduction: The Changing Face of World Trade and the Greatest Challenge Facing the WTO 
and the World Today” in R P. Buckley (ed) The WTO and the Doha Round: The Changing Face of World 
Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2003) ch 1, 2. 
26 Brazil issued a compulsory licence on Efavirenz on grounds of “public interest” to ensure the supply of the 
drug for its national AIDS programme after a series of negotiations with the patent holder, Merck, broke down. 
at  http://www.accesstopharmaceuticals.org/case-studies-in-global-health/efavirenz-brazil/ (retrieved 27 Jan 
2013). Thailand had issued a compulsory licence on the grounds of “public non-commercial use” drug for heart 
disease, Plavix in January 2007. 
27 TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(b) spells out a government may issue a compulsory licence to produce generic 
drugs without the authorization of the patent holder where negotiations fail to obtain authorization on reasonable 
commercial terms. The negotiations may be waived in cases of national emergency, extreme emergency or non-
commercial use. 
28 See General Council decision of 6 December 2005 WT/l/641 (Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement) in 
response to the Doha Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001).  The General Council has 
extended the deadline to formally incorporate the August 2003 Waiver into the TRIPS Agreement when two 
thirds of the WTO’s members have accepted the change to 31 December 2013 at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm. 
29 C Correa Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards 
of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002 at < 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/pubindex.htm#books>. Post TRIPS, in Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 
v Towa Yakuhin K.K., Tokyo High Court, Civil 6th Division, Case No. 3498(ne), 31 March 1998; affirmed by 
Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court, Case No. 1998 (ju) 153, April 16, 1999, the Japanese Supreme Court 
held that “use for regulatory review purposes was sheltered from infringement liability by the experimental use 
defence in Japanese law, and the use of a patented invention for purposes of obtaining a licence to market a 
generic version of a patented medicine was not an infringement of the patent.” The German Supreme Court in 
Klinische Versuche II German Federal Supreme Court 1998 RPC 423 held that “the intention to use the results 
of experiments and trials for the purpose of obtaining regulatory approval was irrelevant to the determination of 
whether an act fell within the experimental use exception”. See WT/DS114/R, Canada - Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products - Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States - Report of the 
Panel, 17 March 2000, para 5.7. 
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capacity to produce generic medicines of drugs under patent protection in the developed 
world, an opportunity foregone with minimum standards of patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals introduced under the TRIPS Agreement. Developing member countries 
would have to wait for the expiry of the patent term to produce generics.   
 
Patent protection and data exclusivity terms are both important incentives to the research and 
development outlays by pharmaceutical companies to ensure that there are returns to 
investment over a limited duration. 30  However, where the drug is covered under patent 
protection, data exclusivity may extend after the patent has expired creating another obstacle 
to access (where marketing approval was obtained towards the end of the patent period) and 
block generic competition even when compulsory licences have been granted.31 Producers 
with the capacity and willingness to supply the world market with low-priced medicines 
under patent in developed countries are located mainly in developing countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Thailand.32 Thus the strongest impact of 
data exclusivity would be in countries such as India and Brazil which did not have patent 
protection for medicines until required to be TRIPS compliant.  
 
Emanating from different legislative frameworks such as unfair competition laws,33 law of 
confidentiality of Information and Product 34  or Food and Drug Regulations, 35  data 
exclusivity now falls under the guise of intellectual property protection and free trade rules. 
The application of confidentiality to pharmaceutical test data submitted for approval provides 
what is sometimes deemed a trade secrets obstacle to access in addition to the patents obstacle.  
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement on unfair competition and the protection of undisclosed 
test data states: 
 
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis 
of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with 
paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance with 
paragraph 3. 
 
[…]   
 
3.   Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed 
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, 
except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use. 
 
The concern as to exclusivity arises primarily in the need for protection of “undisclosed test 
or other data”. Under the two limbs in Article 39.3, once member countries require test data 
to be submitted for marketing approval, compliance is mandatory to ensure protection of the 
                                                          
30Ibid, in para 4.21 the Panel noted that product development, application and regulatory review processes for 
innovator drugs take between eight to 12 years while the process for generics takes up to three to six and a half 
years. 
31 "Data exclusivity in international trade agreements: What consequences for access to medicines?" Médecins 
Sans Frontières whitepaper at http://www.msfaccess.org/content/data-exclusivity-international-trade-
agreements-what-consequences-access-medicines (retrieved 14 Dec 2012) 
32  H Hestermeyer Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p 10. 
33 Antigua & Barbuda, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago. 
34 Argentina. 
35 See, for example, Food and Drug Regulations C.R.C. 1978, c. 870, C.08.004.1(1), Canada. 
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data submitted first, against “unfair commercial use” and in addition (i.e secondly) against 
“disclosure”. Thus, the primary purpose of Article 39.3 is not about protecting secrecy of data 
but to guard against “unfair commercial use” by generic competitors obtaining marketing 
approval without having to conduct clinical trials to produce their own data,36 and secondly 
its secrecy.37 The qualifier that follows provides for two exceptions for disclosure of the test 
data “where necessary to protect the public” or “unless steps are taken to ensure that the data 
are protected against unfair commercial use”. The first exception is subject to a necessity test 
under WTO’s rules while the second allows for disclosure when there is no unfair 
commercial use. 
 
The text and language of Article 39.3 of TRIPS is reproduced almost verbatim under Article 
1711 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for trade secrets:38  
 
5. If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or agricultural 
chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data 
necessary to determine whether the use of such products is safe and effective, the Party shall protect 
against disclosure of the data of persons making such submissions, where the origination of such data 
involves considerable effort, except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps 
are taken to ensure that the data is protected against unfair commercial use.  
 
6. [..] no person other than the person that submitted them may, without the latter's permission, rely on 
such data in support of an application for product approval during a reasonable period of time after their 
submission. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally mean not less than five years from the 
date on which the Party granted approval…. 
 
Interestingly, the first limb of Article 39.3 “to protect against unfair commercial use” is 
conspicuously missing from paragraph 5 of the NAFTA text. Paragraph 6 of the NAFTA text 
specifies a 5 year exclusivity period that was not included in the TRIPS text at the insistence 
of developing countries.39 Nevertheless, government drug regulatory agencies are deemed to 
be under the obligation to ensure non-disclosure of the test data registered by an original 
manufacturer of a new innovative drug to be used for the registration of a generic equivalent 
for a fixed period of 5 to 10 years.40  
 
The term of protection for data exclusivity for human use drugs varies from country to 
country ranging from five to eight years. 41 Australia 42 and New Zealand 43 have specific 
legislation providing for a 5-year data exclusivity period. The European Union amendments 
to the Directive relating to medicinal products for human use introduced a new data 
exclusivity system for original medicines and provided for an abridged process whereby the 
                                                          
36 N de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2005) Sec. 7, p 392. 
37 Ibid (See pp 389 – 393 for a more in-depth discussion of unfair commercial use). 
38 North American Free Trade Agreement of 17 December 1992, Article 1711 section 5 at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=149#A1711. 
39 Ibid, section 6. 
40 An important issue concerned the direct or indirect use of the test data for subsequent registrations of similar 
products. In the negotiating history of Article 39.3 a period of less than 5 years was put forward but not included 
in the final text. See the Brussels Draft in GATT document MTN,TNC/W/35/Rev.1, 3 Dec 1990, Art. 42.4A. 
(See Carlvaho p 391 fn 982), 
41  United States: 5 Years for new pharmaceutical chemical entities, 3 years for new indications for 
pharmaceutical drugs, and 12 years for biologic products. European Union: 8 Years (+ 2 Years market 
exclusivity + 1 year for new indication); Japan: 8 Years; China: a protection period of 6 years was  promised by 
the government for pharmaceutical drugs when applying for membership to the World Trade Organization. 
42 Data Exclusivity Provision of the Therapeutic Goods Act (Cth) 1989 (Australia), s.25A.  
43Introduced under the Medicines Amendment Act Commencement Order 1994 in compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
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public agencies can only grant permission for generic drugs after the exclusivity period 
provided for the original drug or medicinal product. 44 There is an eight-year exclusivity 
period in place of the six to 10 years adopted by different countries in the European Union. It 
introduces also a requirement under the term “market exclusivity” that disallows the 
marketing of a generic equivalent for a further two years from the expiry of the data 
exclusivity period,45 effectively evergreening the patent for a further period of time.  
 
4. Tempering the Data Exclusivity Obstacle   
 
Data exclusivity creates a data monopoly that potentially defeats the purpose of any grant of a 
compulsory licence for developing countries to benefit from cheaper medicines preventing 
generic drug manufacturers from accessing the data. Public and private interests diverge as 
the research-based pharmaceutical industry has never considered compulsory licensing a 
necessary or sustainable means of improving access to medicines.46 While there is a public 
interest for patent protection to encourage invention of new medicines for the prevention and 
cure of diseases, the private interest is essentially solely profit driven.47 Understandably, as 
pharmaceutical companies incur huge financial outlays on research and development crucial 
to the search for new cures (research and development expenditure by pharmaceutical 
companies in 2002 amounted to US$45 billion 48), it would be unfair that generic drug 
producers should be able to free ride on the data and obtain competitive advantage without 
any investment on their part.  
 
The inbuilt flexibility for compulsory licensing to temper patent protection explicitly spelt out 
in Article 31 is not reflected under Article 39.3. Without an explicit provision to temper the 
data exclusivity obstacle there is a quest for the interpretation of an implicit exception to 
overcome the obstacle for access to medicines. This section explores the views of leading 
commentators mostly holding the stance that the obligation under Article 39.3 does not set 
out exclusive rights. Correa, a leading commentator, considers Article 39.3 to be “narrowly 
drawn” allowing countries to maintain “substantial flexibility in implementation” as public 
interest must ensure that it does not constitute an obstacle for generic competitors of off-
patent drugs and access to medicines.49 Interpreting “unfair commercial use” Correa views 
that defining what “unfair” means is at the discretion of each national government. Inasmuch 
as it may be fair for the United States and the European Union to want regulatory data 
protection, it is likewise fair that developing countries deem so otherwise. Thus “granting 
market approval to a second entrant” based on the latter product’s similarity to the first 
registered product is not prohibited under Article 39.3 in the absence of “dishonest” uses, 
                                                          
 44  See Council Directive 2004/27/EC, 31 March 2004 (amending Directive 2001/83 relating to medicinal 
products for human use) introducing a new data exclusivity system for original medicines. 
45 Art. 10(1)(a)(iii) Council Directive 2004/27/EC, 31 March 2004. 
46 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations  “Statement on Compulsory Licence for 
Export” <http://www.efpia.org/3_press/20030830.htm> (EFPIA Statement). 
47 F M Abbot “The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference” 
Occasional Paper  7, 5 (Sep 2001) Quaker United Nations Office.  
48  See International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Research & Development at 
http://www.ifpma.org//issues/issues_research  (retrieved 13 Dec 2012). The pesticide industry, for example, 
typically spends $5 million to $15 million over a period that may well stretch between 14 to 22 years to develop 
a commercially viable product before expecting returns to investment to be able to successfully market 1 out of 
every 10,000 chemicals (See Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 104 S.Ct.2862, 2870 (1984)). 
49 C Correa Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards 
of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002, Executive Summary. 
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fraud and breach of confidence.50 He takes the stance that countries are not obligated under 
Article 39.3 to confer exclusive rights for test data submitted to the government for approval 
as the broad coverage advocated by pharmaceutical industries and some countries51 is not 
supported by the text of negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement.52 Likewise, Yamane 
argues that flexibility within Article 39.3 allows leeway for developing countries. Article 
39.3 is not to be construed in terms of the obligation perceived by developed countries that 
data submitted for marketing approval must remain exclusive to the originator of the data for 
a period of time.53  
 
Correa asserts too that the two exceptions “where necessary to protect the public” or where 
the data are “protected against unfair commercial use”54  in UNCTAD’s view authorise the 
use of test data to assess third parties’ subsequent applications for registration of similar 
products.55 Carlvaho, another commentator, likewise, interprets the first exception as implicit 
permission to disclose in the public interest (though he thinks that it is not workable in 
practice as test data can be used by generic manufacturers in other countries).56  
 
Correa’s interpretation of a wholly voluntary Article 39.3 has met with some strong 
criticisms. Wadlow strongly suggests, Article 39.3 must necessarily be construed not in 
isolation but in the light of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property on unfair competition to which it relates,57 which concerns situations of 
competition between competitors rather than legislative acts of governments.58 A national 
authority in its public duty to fairly balance the “rights and legitimate expectations of 
individual subjects” cannot be said to be engaged in unfair competition even if it 
disadvantages a business competitor.59 Such legislative acts of governments would be fair.60 
Analysing Article 39.3 as it stands retrospectively, the western countries were not interested 
in legislating against unfair competition more so than responding to the lobbying by 
pharmaceutical companies whose main concern was to obtain mandatory international 
protection of test data but India led the way opposing trade secrets status for test data under 
the intellectual property regime.61 However, while disagreeing with Correa’s conclusion that 
Article 39.3 imposes no international requirement on all WTO members, Wadlow concedes 
that:62 
 
                                                          
50 Ibid.See also the Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy, London, September 2002, pp 50-51 and 163. 
51 C Correa Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards 
of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002, p 46.  
52 Ibid, Executive Summary.  
53 H Yamane Interpreting TRIPS: Globalisation of Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines (Hart 
Publishing, 2011), p 471. 
54 See C Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the 
Standards of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002, p 21 (emphasis added). 
55 Ibid, p 46. 
56 N de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2005),  pp 389 & 394. 
57 See Article 39.1 of the TRIPS Agreement . 
58 C Wadlow “Regulatory data protection under TRIPs Article 39(3) and article 10bis of the Paris Convention: is 
there a doctor in the house?” (2008) IPQ, 355, 370. 
59 Ibid, 371-372. 
60 Ibid, 372. 
61 Ibid, 381-382. 
62 Ibid, 379 (citing A X Fellmeth, “Secrecy, Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade 
Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs Agreement” (2004) 45 Harvard International 
Law Journal 443, 460). 
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Article 39 of the TRIPs Agreement does not encompass a data exclusivity obligation per se as a matter 
of positive law, particularly not when disclosure of marketing approval data is ‘necessary to protect the 
public.’ 
 
The essential purpose under Article 39.3 is to prevent “parasitic behaviour” and “free-riding” 
by competitors entering the market with bio-equivalents,63 and so ensure governments do not 
allow the registration of competing products. Data exclusivity though housed under the 
TRIPS regime is not an extension of patent protection and is separate from undisclosed 
information and the confidentiality of perpetual trade secret information (such as secret 
formulas and compositions) submitted to governments under Article 39.2. Such data 
protection does not prevent the production of generic versions of new drugs and products 
(even during the data exclusivity period) as long as the second entrant does not use or rely on 
the original test data.64 
 
The United States’ Supreme Court decision in Ruckelshaus v Monsanto65 supports the view 
that national authorities are able to rely on test data provided for the first registration to grant 
approval for a second comer’s “similar” product. The legislative history of the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 1947 shows while FIFRA specifically 
prohibited disclosure of “any information relative to formulas of products”,66 it was silent on 
the use of health and safety data. 67 Amendments, in 1972, specifically provided under a 
mandatory data-licensing scheme to consider data (not designated as “trade secrets or 
commercial or financial information”) submitted by one applicant for registration in support 
of another application for a similar chemical with compensation to the original submitter of 
the data.68 Data designated as “trade secrets or commercial or financial information” could 
not be used to support a subsequent registration unless the first original applicant consented.69 
Further amendments in 1978 specified a 10-year exclusivity period on new active 
ingredients. 70  A new subsection provided for “disclosure of all health, safety, and 
environmental data to qualified requesters, notwithstanding the prohibition against disclosure 
of trade secrets71 where such disclosure was “necessary to protect against an unreasonable 
risk of injury to health or the environment”.72 The overriding philosophy of the Supreme 
Court was summed up as:73 
 
[T] public purpose behind the data-consideration provisions is clear from the legislative history. Congress 
believed that the provisions would eliminate costly duplication of research and streamline the registration 
process, making new end-use products available to consumers more quickly. 
 
                                                          
63 See N de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2005), pp 392-3. 
64  See generally “Data exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines” Jul 2011, International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association at 
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_Web.pdf (retrieved 
13 Dec 2012). 
65 Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 104 S.Ct. 2862 (1984).  
66 FIFRA §§ 3(c)(4) and 8(c) 
67 Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2867 (1984). 
68 FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D). 
69 Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2867 (1984). 
70 FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D)(i) for data registered after September 30, 1978. 
71 Ibid, § 10(d), 7 USC § 136h(d). 
72 Ibid, §§ 10(d)(1)(A) to (C). 
73 Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2879 (1984). 
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In Bayer v Canada (Attorney General)74 the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in reconciling 
the language under its Food and Regulations Act and NAFTA75 held that the data exclusivity 
provision does not apply where there has been no reliance on the first applicant’s test data. 
No protection is required if the national authority approves a second entrant’s application 
without examining the original applicant’s test data where the products are similar or bio-
equivalents:76 
 
Subsection C.08.004.1(1) […] provide for the use of that [test data] by the government on behalf of the 
generic manufacturer and when that occurs, the minimum five year protection from competition for the 
innovator applies. Where the government does not use that confidential or trade secret information on 
behalf of the generic manufacturer, the provision is not applicable. 
 
Thus when a competing generic manufacturer files an “Abbreviated New Drug” submission 
for a pharmaceutically equivalent and bioequivalent product based solely by comparing the 
innovator’s product that is publicly marketed and the Minister does not need to examine or 
rely on the test data filed, the exclusivity period of 5 years does not apply.77   
 
5. A Parallel Approach: PA for Compulsory Licensing  and Waiver of Article 39.3 
 
As noted above, an explicit compulsory mechanism for tempering data exclusivity is absent 
under Article 39.3. 78 However, the object of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 779 on 
intellectual property and Article 880 on public health does not necessarily confer exclusive 
rights for test data. The current interpretation as it stands requiring generic manufacturers to 
repeat clinical trials for test data already known would be duplicating the process and cause 
unnecessary delay.81 With the global need for access to essential medicines, the World Health 
Organisation opposed requirements for tests to be repeated in its entirety amounting to 
multiple human testing because of resource implications for developing countries.82 This also 
illustrates that the consideration of regulation of data exclusivity involves a “public interest” 
nature, which should be distinguished from a pure private property dimension. One option to 
temper data exclusivity is compulsory licensing of the test data. Another would be to consider 
a waiver of Article 39.3 to avoid repeating clinical trials for the same data already available. 
                                                          
74 Bayer v Canada (Attorney General) 1999 CarswellNat 1047, 243 N.R. 170, 87 C.P.R. (3d) 293, 243 N.R. 170, 
87 C.P.R. (3d) 293. 
75Ibid, [15] referring to NAFTA, Article 1711 sections 5 and 6 and the Canadian Food and Drug Regulations 
C.R.C. 1978, c. 870, C.08.004.1(1). 
76 Ibid, [18]. 
77 Ibid, [7] - [8]. 
78 C Wadlow “Regulatory data protection under TRIPs Article 39(3) and article 10bis of the Paris Convention: is 
there a doctor in the house?” (2008) IPQ, 355, 358. 
79 TRIPS Agreement Article 7 states that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should be  
mutually advantageous in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations. 
80 TRIPS Agreement Article 8 (1) allows the adoption of “measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic […] 
development”. 
81 See Carlos Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the 
Standards of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002, p 44. 
82 Developing International Standards for the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, Presentation to International 
Generic Pharmaceuticals Association by Dr. Juhana E. Idanpaan-Heikkila, Special Advisor, Quality Assurance 
and Safety, World Health Organization, June 1999. (See WT/DS114/R, Canada - Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products - Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States - Report of the 
Panel, 17 March 2000,  para 4.38 and fn 275). 
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First, national laws can temper data exclusivity depending on the applicable legal system 
for the approval of a second-entry marketing application. Correa had canvassed an option 
for national authorities to “examine and rely upon the data submitted by the originator to 
evaluate the second-entrant application”. Such use would not amount to a "commercial 
use" of the data” as the second comer generic manufacturer would not use the data (only 
the government would).83 As the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal surmised the five-year 
protection applies only when there has been reliance on the test data.84 In the WTO Panel 
for Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Australia’s view was that, 
hypothetically, “a regulatory system could approve the proposed marketing of an image 
product solely through documentary cross-referencing and without any relevant use or 
manufacture of the patented pharmaceutical”.85  
 
Secondly, there is clearly an avenue for compulsory licensing of test data with or without 
compensation when the United States required Dow Chemicals to license inter alia quality 
control data and other research materials without compensation when it acquired the Rugby-
Darby Group Companies.86 Likewise, under the United States FIFRA it is possible to use test 
data belonging to the originator (without their consent) for the grant of approval in 
subsequent applications with some form of compensation.87 Thus though Article 39.3 is silent 
as to an explicit exception for data exclusivity, compulsory licensing of test data is possible 
and feasible under the GATTS/TRIPS umbrella.88 The authors view, though (in terms of 
practicality), that it would not do justice to require the developing world and least developed 
countries when confronted with a public health emergency to pursue separately a duplicate 
process of compulsory licensing for access to test data. 
 
Correa’s views support a waiver as a data exclusivity regime cannot be allowed to be an 
obstacle for the execution of a compulsory licence or government use. Carlhavo considers, 
likewise, that use of test data from clinical trials covered by a patent is fair where a 
government grants a compulsory licence of the patent to a generic manufacturer for the 
marketing of the generic version of a drug,89 as otherwise, it would be ineffective and cause 
delay to require independent clinical trials and data.90 Such use of test data is intrinsically fair 
under compulsory licensing of the patent as the generic product and the original drug are the 
same as “like” products rather than “competing” products. Needless to say, a waiver of the 
data exclusivity regime would be an intuitive corollary of the PA to compulsory licensing in 
                                                          
83 See Carlos Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the 
Standards of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002, p 31. 
84 Bayer v Canada (Attorney General) 1999 CarswellNat 1047, 243 N.R. 170, 87 C.P.R. (3d) 293, 243 N.R. 170, 
87 C.P.R. (3d) 293, [18]. 
85 WTO Panel Report, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000, 
para 5.7. 
86 See http://www.cptech.org/pharm/cl.html (retrieved 4 Jan 2013) 
87 C Correa Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards 
of the TRIPS Agreement, South Centre 2002, p 45. See also p 31 fn 19.  
88 N de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2005), p 397 n 992.  
89 Ibid, p 395. 
90 See Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States – The Relationship Between 
the Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines, WTO document IP/C/W/280, 12 June 2001, at 
[16]: “The EC and their member States consider, though, that Article 39.3 neither obliges Members to have 
marketing approval procedures, nor does it prescribe what those procedures should be. The provision should 
certainly not be interpreted in such a way as to weaken or nullify Members' rights under other Articles of the 
Agreement, such as the 'fast track' procedure in case of emergency foreseen under Article 31(b), which is a 
recognition of the need, in certain circumstances, for compulsory licences to be given immediate effect.” at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_eu_w280_e.htm (retrieved 12 Dec 2012).  
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order to achieve a systematic and coherent interpretation of the legal text.  The PA should be 
equally applicable to compulsory licensing and to data exclusivity in order to swiftly address 
domestic stockpiling needs for drugs via an expedient track under a pending public health 
emergency.  
 
The authors consider this a logical approach parallel to the grant of compulsory licensing for 
pharmaceutical patents in a public health emergency.  Thus once the PA serves as a trigger 
for compulsory licensing it “may be necessary to waive the rights conferred under data 
exclusivity” to obtain marketing approval of the product.91 As noted above, the legitimacy of 
adopting the PA framework for access to medicines justifying a safe margin and trigger for 
compulsory licensing had traversed the grounds of a risk analysis and the extent to which 
WTO members can exercise their precautionary entitlements. To justify legitimate 
differential treatment of adopting a PA for health technologies associated with significant 
risks to human life and health, a “like-product analysis” was made between such health 
technologies and other technologies, to ensure it is “non-discriminatory” and achieves the 
least trade restrictive approach. Thus rather than attempting to justify a separate compulsory 
licensing argument for data exclusivity, a waiver of the exclusivity period once a PA for 
compulsory licensing of the patent is adopted is necessary from a commonsense and 
holistically human rights view, which will be further discussed in the next section.  
 
The same arguments negate a tailor-made PA to temper data exclusivity. 92 When all the 
factors for a precautionary approach to trigger the compulsory licence are fulfilled and patent 
protection on a drug is removed, a parallel grant for disclosure of the data would not be unfair 
commercial use. The PA can temper data exclusivity as a justification for access as a matter 
of necessity once the prerequisite of declaring a public health emergency to empower a state 
with emergency powers is dealt with to enable government to allocate appropriate resources 
to combat the epidemic. A compulsory licence for access to medicines is of no use without 
access to data for the same medicines. The precautionary approach is perceived by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) as constituting “an integral part of the decision-making 
process leading to the adoption of any measure for the protection of human health”.93 The 
intention of the phraseology “approach” adopted hints at a more flexible application of 
precaution.94  
 
So far access to AIDS medicines has eclipsed other needs but the SARS outbreak in China 
and South East Asia and the anthrax scare should serve as a wake-up call to the world 
community at large. These must incite in each and every party be it the pharmaceutical 
industry, non-government organisations, least developed countries and developing or 
                                                          
91  C Correa “Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under Free Trade 
Agreements” UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue on Moving the pro-development IP agenda forward: Preserving 
Public Goods in health, education and learning, Bellagio, 29 November – 3 December 2004, p 12. 
92 As Stein J of the New South Wales (NSW) Land and Environment Court had stated: “the precautionary 
principle is a statement of commonsense and has already been applied by decision-makers in appropriate 
circumstances prior to the principle being spelt out”. In  Leatch v Director-General, National Parks and Wildlife 
Service 81 LGERA 270 1993 WL 1405558, 282.  
93 ECJ Case C–236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and 
Others (Monsanto), ECR 2003 I–08105, adopted 9 September 2003, para 133. 
94 See for example, Laing  J’s view that “adopting an approach, rather than a principle, appropriately imports a 
certain degree of flexibility and tends, though not dispositively, to underscore reticence about making premature 
pronouncements about desirable normative structures” in Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) 27 August 1999, para 19 at 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/Separate.Laing.27.08.99.E.pdf (retrieved 19 
Dec 2012) 
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developed countries the understanding that we are all part of this fabric. Clinical test data 
should be treated as a “public good” requiring the most transparency rather than secrecy.95 
The regulation of clinical test data carries with it the conflicting natures of public and private 
considerations and one must constantly be weighed against the other depending on the 
circumstances. In times of emergencies when the protection for civilians outweighs the 
private dimension of data exclusivity, a waiver should be called to balance the two agendas, 
with a view to facilitating an adaptable and organic intellectual property regime. 
 
6. A Human Rights Perspective 
 
With developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Thailand 
with the manufacturing capacity to supply the world market with low-priced medicines, 
developing countries must take a stand as their people come perilously close to dying from 
AIDS while in dire need for access to affordable medicines. 96 The lives of their people 
depend on it.  India’s generic producer, Cipla, took a humanitarian stand to produce generic 
ARV drugs on patent in the United States, Europe and South Africa for supply to AIDS 
patients in Africa at affordable prices.97 A major manufacturer it offered supply of the AIDS 
drug to Medicins Sans Frontieres at 65 per cent below patented prices, which distributed it 
free in Africa.98 India was protected from foreign competition for decades without patent 
laws. Producing generics, the Indian drug industry at its most competitive in 2004 met 25 per 
cent of the global generics market for low cost drugs.99 Reports showed that prices for certain 
generic AIDS medicines have fallen to US$300 per patient a year compared to an all-time 
high of US$10,000-US$12,000 for patented drugs in the year 2000.100  
 
The developing world had mustered the political will to achieve the Doha breakthrough for 
access to medicines. Brazil led the way and showed that the real impetus must come from 
them. Brazil managed to arm-twist the pharmaceutical giants, Roche and Merck, under the 
threat of compulsory licensing to manufacture generic AIDS drug for its domestic use in 
2001. Both companies succumbed and agreed to reduce costs to 30-40 per cent of what it 
would have cost in the United States, allowing Brazil to provide free medication for millions 
                                                          
95 See J H Reichman “Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under the TRIPS Agreement and its progeny: A Broader 
perspective” UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue on Moving the pro-development IP agenda forward: Preserving Public 
Goods in health, education and learning, Bellagio, 29 November – 3 December 2004, p 17. See also C Wadlow 
“Regulatory data protection under TRIPs Article 39(3) and article 10bis of the Paris Convention: is there a 
doctor in the house?” (2008) IPQ, 355, 403 fn 154, and Skillington and Solovy, “The Protection of Test and 
Other Data required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPs Agreement” (2003) 24 Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business 1, 51. 
96 Note even Canada was concerned that it needed another policy tool to address cost containment for medicines 
as expenditures on therapeutic drugs had been rising steadily by significant amounts from $1.1 billion annually 
in 1975 to $8.6 billion by 1992-93 noting balances needed to address the concern about the costs to the health 
care system that enhanced protection under the TRIPS Agreement would entail. Canada’s $400 million generic 
drug industry annually accounted for approximately 40 per cent of all prescriptions filled in 1997, but only 
amounted to about 15 per cent of the total cost of such drugs. See WT/DS114/R, Canada - Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products - Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States - Report of the 
Panel, 17 March 2000, para 4.21. 
97  See also H Yamane Interpreting TRIPS: Globalisation of Intellectual Property Rights and Access to 
Medicines (Hart Publishing, 2011), pp 279 fn 68. 
98 B Condon “The Twin Security Challenges of AIDS and Terrorism: Implications for Flows of Trade, Capital, 
People and Knowledge” in R P. Buckley (ed) The WTO and the Doha Round : The Changing Face of World 
Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2003),  277. 
99 J Hepburn “Implementing the Paragraph 6 Decision and Doha Declaration: Solving Practical Problems to 
Make the System Work” (May 2004) Quaker United Nations Office, 6, at <http://www.quno.org.>.  
100 UNAID/WHO “2004 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic”, p 14.  
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of victims. The threat made price reductions as advantageous as the cost of manufacturing in 
the government laboratory to reach an optimal price for the drugs and combat the infection 
rate to 0.65 per cent.101 
 
Following the Anthrax scare (a bio-terror threat via mailing of anthrax-laden powder in the 
Washington DC area), the United States and Canada similarly threatened Bayer successfully 
for the drug Cipro.102 It drew a new focus on patent protection and access to essential drugs 
and showed up starkly the double standards of the developed countries,103 to place firmly on 
the Doha agenda the need for a better bargain under the WTO in terms of access to affordable 
medicines for developing countries themselves.104 The developed world in copying Brazilian 
tactics and the threat of compulsory licensing for the drug Cipro105 well understands that no 
responsible government should place the public health of its citizens at stake for the sake of 
the pharmaceutical industry.106 
 
Compounding the data exclusivity term of protection and monopoly are blatant US bilateral 
“free trade agreements” with other countries in flagrant disregard of the Doha Health 
Declaration.107 In June 2004, Thailand, with manufacturing capacity to produce a generic 
version of the AIDS drug for export to eligible countries, was indirectly pressured in the form 
of favourable trading deals in exchange for agreement not to issue compulsory licences,108 
though change is evident in the bold efforts of both Thailand and Brazil in 2007 by issuing 
compulsory licences.109 The United States had also negotiated “data exclusivity provisions” 
with their trading partners in Central America as well as Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos.110  
 
The Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) includes 
test data exclusivity provisions that such data can be kept secret which would make it very 
                                                          
101 B Condon “The Twin Security Challenges of AIDS and Terrorism: Implications for Flows of Trade, Capital, 
People and Knowledge” in R P. Buckley (ed) The WTO and the Doha Round : The Changing Face of World 
Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2003),  266-269. 
102 F M Abbot “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at 
the WTO” (2002) 5 JIEL 469, 487. 
103 H Sun ‘The Road to DOHA and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’ 
[2004] 15 (1) EJIL 123, 134. 
104 B Condon “The Twin Security Challenges of AIDS and Terrorism: Implications for Flows of Trade, Capital, 
People and Knowledge” in R P. Buckley (ed) The WTO and the Doha Round : The Changing Face of World 
Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2003),  271. 
105 Ibid, 270. 
106 F M Abbot “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at 
the WTO” (2002) 5 JIEL 469, 488. 
107 F M Abbot “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Contradictory Trend 
in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements” Occasional Paper 14, (Apr 2004) Quaker United Nations 
Office, 2, at <http://www.quno.org.>  
108  S Boseley “France Accuses US of Aids Blackmail” The Guardian 14  July 14, 2004 at     
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1260695,00.html>  
109 The bold action of Thailand in issuing a compulsory licence for the drug Plavix for chronic diseases 
treatment viewed by some critics as overstepping the appropriate application of compulsory licensing saw 
Abbot Laboratories retaliating by refusing to market its new pharmaceutical products in Thailand and 
withdrawing registration applications of new pharmaceutical products. Thailand was also placed on the US 
Special 301 Priority Watch List. See Abbott Pharmaceuticals in Thailand: Fact Sheet, 13 April 2007 at 
<http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/campaigns/access_to_medicines/news_publications/Abbott% 
20in%20Thailand>. 
110 A X Fellmeth “Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law” (2004) 45 
Harv. Int'l L.J. 443, 455- 456. 
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expensive for generic drug manufacturers to redo the tests.111 This would impede access to 
essential lifesaving medicines for AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. As opposition to CAFTA-
DR shows as well, manufacturing costs of generic drugs are much cheaper relative to the 
costs involved in test data and drug trials. For Guatemala, for example, generics will have to 
wait another five years under CAFTA. Otherwise, Guatemala introduced patents only in 2000 
after WTO’s transition period and generics would have been legal for drugs which were not 
patented in Guatemala before 2000. 112  
 
The previous WTO Director-General, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi had hailed the Doha 
Declaration as a historic agreement:113 
 
[T..] The final piece of the jigsaw has fallen into place, allowing poorer countries to make full use of the 
flexibilities in the WTO’s intellectual property rules in order to deal with the diseases that ravage their 
people. It proves once and for all that the organization can handle humanitarian as well as trade concerns.  
 
The then European Union Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, had added:114 
 
[..] the deal on access to medicines. Vital if we are to show that the WTO and the multilateral system is 
not just about mindless liberalization, or kow-towing to globalization. Of course, we have much more 
work to do to ensure delivery in practice, on the ground. But the deal, however long we waited for it, 
shows that the WTO can and will put people before markets. 
 
Reichman,115 in support of either compulsory licensing or waiver, argues that above all the 
integrity of the spirit at Doha116 must be preserved to minimise the social cost of any data 
protection regime adopted. 117  His interpretation of Article 39.3 favours disclosure as 
member states are “always free to refer to at least the majority of the clinical trial data of 
any innovator company, when considering an application for a generic equivalent, without 
committing any breach of international law”.118  
 
                                                          
111 CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), Article 15.10: Measures Related to Certain 
Regulated Products at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file934_3935.pdf (retrieved 25 
Feb 2012). 
112 "Data exclusivity in international trade agreements: What consequences for access to medicines?" Médecins 
Sans Frontières whitepaper at http://www.msfaccess.org/content/data-exclusivity-international-trade-
agreements-what-consequences-access-medicines (retrieved 14 Dec 2012) 
113 (Press/350/Rev.1, 30 August 2003, “Decision removes final patent obstacle to cheap drug imports” at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm>). 
114 WT/MIN(03)/ST/5, 10 September 2003, Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session, Cancún, 10 - 14 September 
2003, Statement by Mr Pascal Lamy European Union Commissioner for Trade.  
115 J H Reichman “Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data under the TRIPS Agreement and its progeny: A Broader 
perspective” UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue on Moving the pro-development IP agenda forward: Preserving Public 
Goods in health, education and learning, Bellagio, 29 November – 3 December 2004, p 17. 
116 See para 4 of the Doha Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001):  “We agree that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. 
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO 
Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose”.  
117 J H Reichman “Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data Under the TRIPS Agreement and Its Progeny: A Broader 
Perspective” UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue on Moving the pro-development IP agenda forward: Preserving Public 
Goods in health, education and learning, Bellagio, 29 November – 3 December 2004, p 3. 
118 C Wadlow “Regulatory data protection under TRIPs Article 39(3) and article 10bis of the Paris Convention: 
is there a doctor in the house?” (2008) IPQ, 355, 402. 
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The UNAID exhorts:119 
 
Strategies to manage intellectual property that are oriented towards public health goals, such as the full 
use, as required, of flexibilities permitted under international regulations such as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights administered by the World Trade Organization, will play 
a critical role. International actors should avoid provisions in free-trade agreements that potentially 
undermine access to affordable, life-saving medicines and health technologies. 
 
7.      Conclusion 
 
The legal status of the Doha Declaration has been incorporated under the amendments in 
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement.120 Of the competing options for a less ambiguous 
interpretation of Article 39.3, it is best to consider seriously in parallel a waiver of the data 
exclusivity period once the PA triggers the grant of compulsory licensing for public health 
emergencies. Swift access in a timely manner is crucial for drug supply systems to be more 
reliable. The authors would like to conclude that employment of the PA into the 
intellectual property regime would serve to promote a balance in the rights and obligations 
of patent holders, and legitimise a safety factor for the world for access to medicines in a 
public health emergency. It is a forceful and viable proposal that data exclusivity 
protection must go hand in hand once a compulsory licence is issued under the framework 
developed. The “precautionary approach” as a separate and different legal regime can be 
justified,121 and would be intrinsically fair.122 From a human rights perspective, developing 
countries’ obligation entails protecting access to medicines and guaranteeing against 
excessive pricing by pharmaceutical companies,123 and a broad approach of the application 
of the PA beyond compulsory licensing for access to medicines in public health 
emergencies would benefit developing countries.  
                                                          
119 UNAID 2012 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic, p 56. 
120 Before the amendment, the legal status of the Declaration was deemed ambiguous and would not constitute a 
binding legal instrument in the sense of definitively interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. See S Charnovitz “The 
Legal Status of the Doha Declarations” (2002) 5 JIEL 207 and F M Abbot “The TRIPS Agreement, Access to 
Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference” Occasional Paper  7, (Sep 2001) Quaker United Nations 
Office, 33. 
121 See N de Carvalho The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2005), p 389. 
122 Ibid, p 395-6 
123  H Hestermeyer Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p 136. In the case of GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim had priced their 
antiretrovirals at almost 230 per cent of the generic version. 
